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Hiding in Plain Sight: Denial, 
Deception, and the Non-State 
Actor
James J. Wirtz
History is replete with examples of militaries that have used denial and deception to gain 
victory on the battlefield. Denial withholds accurate information from an adversary, while 
deception puts forward misleading information that conforms to the expectations of an 
opponent. Recently, the advent of the information age has allowed small non-state actors, 
particularly terrorist organizations, to engage in denial and deception—with often devas-
tating results. Unfortunately, states have been slow to adjust, which has allowed terrorist 
groups to carry out their attacks while hiding in plain sight of their targets.
Carl von Clausewitz, the famous military philosopher, never put much stock in denial and deception. “Denial,” in this case, refers to practices 
that are intended to prevent accurate information from reaching opponents. 
“Deception,” on the other hand, involves deliberate activities that are in-
tended to provide opponents with misleading information, causing them to 
perceive reality according to the deceiver’s intentions. For Clausewitz, most 
attempts to deceive opponents were usually not worth the effort. In his day 
and age, such tactics were often too costly, and had the effect of diverting 
resources that were crucial to the main military attack.1 While much has 
changed since this Prussian philosopher offered his commentary on early 
nineteenth century European warfare, today it remains a matter of debate 
as to whether the information revolution has enhanced or has limited the 
prospects for contemporary denial and deception.2 
Among military historians and those who study security and intelli-
gence affairs, there exists virtually unanimous agreement that the informa-
tion revolution has empowered individuals at the expense of governments 
and bureaucracies, giving everyday people the communication, organi-
zational, and analytical capabilities that were only possessed by national 
governments a few short decades ago. But there is less recognition of a new 
recent twist in the practice of denial and deception. Given that information 
about global events has become ubiquitous, it is becoming difficult for 
states, despite their enormous resources, to hide significant developments 
from the outside world. At the same time, it is becoming increasingly easy 
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for individuals or small groups with limited resources and nefarious inten-
tions simply to “hide in plain sight” from law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies. In other words, it might be possible that the information revolu-
tion has empowered the individual vis-à-vis the state when it comes to denial 
and deception, giving terrorists and criminal organizations new abilities to 
blend in with civil society. The practice of denial and deception has thus 
become the crucial enabler for contemporary terrorist cells, especially those 
operating within major urban areas.
To explore this important facet of denial and deception, this article 
will briefly describe what is meant by the terms “denial” and “deception” 
and why each term is important to both world politics and military combat. 
This article will then explain how terrorist cells and criminal organizations 
use denial and deception, while at the same time discussing the ways in 
which such organizations can be hampered in their use of such techniques. 
(For example, because terrorist organizations or spontaneous cells have 
limited resources, they tend to practice denial rather than deception when 
it comes to preventing their detection by state authorities.) The article will 
then briefly explore new ways in which the information revolution might, 
in the end, aid governments and other traditional state actors by making it 
increasingly difficult for terrorists to ‘hide in plain sight.’ 
Denial and Deception
Denial and deception are activities that work together to misdirect or mis-
lead opponents about a deceiver’s presence, activities, or intentions. They 
create the possibility that one’s whole diplomatic or strategic outlook 
might be based on false assumptions or 
incomplete assessments of reality, and 
that these erroneous assessments are 
the product of a sustained campaign 
carried out by one’s opponents. If the 
developing situation is a bit too simple, 
or if potentially threatening events seem 
to be unfolding in a particularly benign 
way, or if innocent explanations for un-
usual events seem to clutter reports from the field, or even highly classified 
intelligence estimates, then prudent policymakers and intelligence analysts 
should begin to suspect that they are falling victim to denial and deception. 
When it comes to denial and deception, policymakers and analysts alike 
should operate on the principle of caveat emptor. 
Denial is based on secrecy and a keen awareness of the signatures—ob-
servable phenomena related to planning, preparing, and undertaking an 
operation—that can tip off an opponent about what is actually about to 
happen. When these signatures are denied to an opponent—as they largely 
were by Japan in the weeks leading up to Pearl Harbor—the “noise” of in-
nocuous events or alternative erroneous explanations can drown out the 
accurate “signals” that would otherwise indicate that an event is about to 
transpire.3 In other words, opponents cannot determine what is about to 
Denial and deception 
are activities that work 
together to misdirect or 
mislead opponents
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transpire because they do not possess the information needed to develop 
an accurate and timely estimate of what is happening. Of course, efforts at 
denial vary in quality.4 Nevertheless, denial is a common practice in interna-
tional relations and military operations. Governments and militaries rarely 
make public their fundamental objectives, or even their own estimates of 
their strengths and weaknesses, in a political or military contest. Denial is 
a constant when it comes to diplomacy and strategy: policymakers, strate-
gists, and intelligence analysts can safely assume that their opponent is 
withholding information.5 
Deception can take a myriad of forms and is limited only by the cre-
ativity and guile of the deception planner. Bogus stories published by legiti-
mate media outlets, fake documents and plans, and false electronic signals 
or communications have all been used to give an opponent an inaccurate 
sense of what is about to transpire. In contrast to denial, which generally 
requires only security or self-awareness when it comes to the ‘signatures’ 
(observable electronic, seismic, social, or biometric evidence) generated by 
various activities, deception can be costly because it can require the expen-
diture of resources to create a convincing false front. For example, the Battle 
for Khe Sanh, which distracted U.S. commanders from the looming threat 
posed by the Viet Cong to the cities of South Vietnam on the eve of the 1968 
Tet Offensive, involved several divisions of the People’s Army of Vietnam. In 
this case, deception involved activities that were so costly to the communist 
war effort that observers still debate which action was, in fact, the main 
avenue of attack and which initiative was the effort at deception.6 
Efforts at denial and deception rely on several factors for their success. 
Practitioners of denial and deception need accurate information not only 
about the way their opponents collect and analyze information, but also 
about their opponent’s beliefs, plans, and expectations. In other words, de-
nial and deception require good intelligence about the opponent. Without 
this information, it might be impossible to control the flow of information 
to the opponent or provide information that will be perceived as credible or 
compelling. Technical virtuosity also plays a part in denial and deception, 
in the sense that the deceiver must employ artistry to attract the target’s 
attention to the misleading information without raising suspicion. Denial 
and deception work because they play off an opponent’s need for informa-
tion, while heightening the opponent’s 
sensitivity to the information that the 
deceiver intends to provide, which 
often includes a message that the op-
ponent also happens to want to hear. 
According to Donald Daniel, “denial 
plays against an adversary’s eagerness 
while deception plays to it. That is, while the denier conceals information 
from the opponent, the deceiver happily provides him with false clues.”7 
The opponent is desperate to learn about the deceiver’s intentions, but the 
opponent has to discover the planted information “naturally” if the decep-
tion is to take a firm hold within their intelligence community.
Denial and deception . . . 
play off an opponent’s need 
for information
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Although the practice of denial and deception in theory sounds highly 
demanding, in practice it can work splendidly, especially if the deceiver can 
channel the flow of information in a way that supports the target’s preferred 
conception of reality. In the early 1970s, for example, Israeli officials based 
their defense policy on three assumptions that came to be described as “the 
concept”: Egypt would be at the center of any Arab coalition against Israel, 
Egypt would not launch a significant attack without a strong prospect of 
victory, and, unless Egypt destroyed the Israeli Air Force, an Arab victory 
would not be possible. Israeli officials also believed that their intelligence 
agencies would provide a “war warning,” which would allow them to mobi-
lize their reserves or even launch a pre-emptive attack—actions that would 
produce an Arab defeat. The “concept” held sway, despite some unusually 
compelling contradictory evidence and an Egyptian denial and deception 
campaign that was itself amateurish.8 Even though Israel was equipped with 
an enormous amount of intelligence that should have raised flags—includ-
ing actual Syrian and Egyptian war plans, reconnaissance photographs 
showing unprecedented force deployments along the Suez Canal and Golan 
Heights, a warning from a credible and trusted spy from the inner circle of 
Egyptian government, information that Soviet personnel and dependents 
were high-tailing it out of Cairo and Damascus, and signals intelligence 
suggesting that their opponents were about to strike—the Israelis never 
managed to act as if they were about to be hit by an all-out Arab assault. As 
a result, the outbreak of the 1973 Yom Kippur War was marked by one of 
the greatest intelligence-command failures in military history. Despite the 
availability of accurate, detailed, and compelling indications of what was 
about to transpire, Israeli analysts and officials could not overcome their 
existing conception of reality in order to act in time to head off disaster.9
The practice of denial and deception is effective because it addresses 
the expectations of the target. Conventional wisdom, based on estimates 
made by Barton Whaley nearly forty years ago, continues to support the 
notion that denial and deception is effective about ninety per cent of the 
time it is attempted.10 Once the deceiver understands the target’s biases, it 
is very difficult for the target to escape the trap. In fact, John Ferris, a lead-
ing historian of twentieth century intelligence, has noted that only four 
qualities allow the target to escape effective denial and deception: “superior 
power and initiative; intelligence of outstanding quality or else so poor that 
it cannot pick up misleading signals, [and] an inability or unwillingness to 
act on any knowledge, true or false.”11 Ironically, two of the qualities iden-
tified by Ferris can be characterized as sheer incompetence, while superior 
performance is often in short supply. Given the fact that most governments 
fall somewhere in the middle of this range of capabilities, it is not surprising 
that efforts at denial and deception are often effective. 
Hiding in Plain Sight
Most of the literature, history, and practice of denial and deception involve 
state actors or military organizations that possess the resources required to 
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(1) deny an opponent accurate information about their true intentions and 
(2) create a second misleading “image” that largely conforms to the expec-
tations of the opponent. This is no small task. It requires a large team of 
analysts and operatives, as well as an effort to deny the opponent accurate 
information and signatures related to one’s true intentions. It also requires 
an understanding of the preferences and expectations of the target, and an 
effective way to transmit information to the opponent in an attractive and 
compelling manner. Traditional denial and deception uses denial to set 
the stage for deception. In other words, denial is used to whet the target’s 
appetite for information, while deception schemes are used to satisfy the 
need for information with stories that fit the needs of the deceiver. For many 
non-state actors—terror cells or even super-empowered individuals who 
would like to use violence to achieve their own political objectives—engag-
ing in traditional denial and deception activities will likely be beyond their 
capabilities. They simply lack the resources to generate and then offer an 
alternative reality to feed to the target. Yet, other forms of denial and de-
ception are not beyond their reach—especially if they reverse the traditional 
balance between denial and deception.
Unlike states or large military formations, small terrorist cells or indi-
viduals face a less daunting challenge when it comes to denial. In contrast to 
an armored corps moving across the desert, for example, a terrorist cell does 
not generate a dust, heat, electromagnetic, or radar signature that can be 
detected from hundreds of miles away. The signature created by a terrorist 
group preparing to launch an attack is relatively weak and diffuse, making 
it difficult to detect against the noise generated by the normal everyday 
activities of the communities in its midst. The challenge is more daunting 
for deception, however, because small cells lack the human or material re-
sources needed to undertake significant deception activities.12 They cannot 
launch duplicate, redundant efforts to mislead opponents. Furthermore, 
increasing the size of their organizations or the scope of their operations is 
unlikely to improve their prospects for success because it tends to increase 
the risk of detection. The more people involved in an operation, the greater 
the risk that someone will go to the police, speak to untrustworthy third 
parties, or risk detection or arrest following some minor run-in with local 
law enforcement.
Because of their weakness vis-à-vis the state, terrorist cells or individu-
als must incorporate denial as a fundamental principle of their operations.13 
Terrorists rely on denial for their very existence. It becomes a strategic asset 
for terrorists because without it, they cannot hope to exist, especially given 
the large asymmetry between their resources and the resources of local law 
enforcement and the state. Denial involves the tightest operational security, 
coupled with a rudimentary strategy of deception. For terrorists, “decep-
tion” involves maintaining a normal routine to the greatest extent possible 
as a cover for the nefarious plans and operations undertaken by the cell. 
This technique can be referred to as “hiding in plain sight.” In fact, decep-
tion is based on an understanding of what the target of deception believes 
to be normal, and the degree to which the target of deception can assimilate 
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anomalies before responding. Deception is therefore not based on feeding 
the target erroneous information, but on making one’s actions comply with 
the expectations of the target. 
Terrorists who hide in plain sight use their normalcy to appeal to the 
widely shared belief that what appears to be normal actually is normal in 
its entirety. In other words, because the image they present to the outside 
world fails to match a pre-existing notion of what (or who) constitutes a 
“threat,” terrorists are largely left alone, despite some anomalies in their 
behavior. Writing about the cell that bombed the World Trade Center in 
1993, Bell notes, “no one in authority noticed the zealous sermons in the 
obscure storefront mosques or imagined that the wars of the Middle East 
might come to Manhattan. This lack of official concern persisted despite the 
visibility of militant Islam: the kidnappings and bombs of Beirut, the warn-
ings in Algeria and Egypt and the threats of violence directed against the 
U.S. Homeland.” Although analysts and a few local authorities knew about 
Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman and the message he was delivering to his follow-
ers, no one took the blind cleric seriously. “His cover,” according to Bell, 
“was that no American authority could imagine him as dangerous. He ap-
peared to be an itinerant migrant who preached in seedy rented rooms.”14
The persistent blindness of U.S. elected officials, law enforcement 
personnel, and intelligence analysts about the true nature of the al-Qaeda 
threat allowed members of the group to hide in plain sight in the months 
leading up to September 11, 2001.15 Despite the fact that Osama bin-Laden 
made little effort to hide his ambition of attacking U.S. citizens and inter-
ests wherever he could find them, or that al-Qaeda had established a track 
record of attacking U.S. interests across the Middle East and Africa, or that 
various law enforcement officials and intelligence analysts were sounding 
alarms about specific events, the terror cells in the United States operated 
virtually unimpeded prior to the September 11 tragedy. Given this track 
record, it is hard to escape the conclusion that a little denial can go a long 
way, especially in the information age. 
Toward Counterdeception
Unlike most observers, Barton Whaley has expressed optimism about the 
possibility of counterdeception, the effort to detect and defeat the denial 
and deception strategies used by terrorist cells. He has devised a theory of 
counterdeception that is particularly well suited to detecting those who are 
hiding in plain sight. While counterdeception is relatively simple in theory, 
it is more difficult to put into practice. But counterdeception sometimes 
does occur and could be more common in the future, especially if law en-
forcement officers, intelligence analysts, and elected officials recognize the 
principles behind the effort to detect individuals who are hiding in plain 
sight.
Counterdeception is based on the idea that every type of human en-
deavor has a large but knowable set of characteristics that must be present 
if it is true to form. Imitations of real activity, or ‘false fronts,’ will lack 
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certain key characteristics, or will have extraneous characteristics added to 
a specific endeavor. The detection of these anomalies is the key element in 
discovering denial and deception because, according to Whaley, “every real 
thing is always, necessarily, completely congruent with all its characteris-
tics.” 16 Moreover, not all anomalies have to be detected before an analyst 
can uncover denial and deception. The detection of one anomaly is enough 
to raise the possibility that something is fundamentally amiss.17 Whaley is 
not alone in offering what amounts to a scientific method for uncovering 
denial and deception. Richards Heuer has developed a similar technique—an 
“analysis of competing hypotheses”—to validate the theoretical assump-
tions underlying intelligence estimates. 18 Heuer suggests that analysts can 
overcome cognitive biases and organizational preferences by comparing 
competing hypotheses and rejecting explanations that fail to account for key 
elements in a developing situation. Anomalies are evidence that something 
is amiss; they are the Achilles heels of deception planners.
Two factors, however, complicate this simple observation about what 
is needed to detect denial and deception. The first is the problem of mea-
surement error. In other words, not every observation of reality is accurate, 
and errors can be read as either false positives or false negatives. No simple 
solution is available to overcome the problem of measurement error, in the 
sense that it is difficult to define and detect significant social anomalies in 
the first place. An analytical or political decision must be made to assess 
what sort of thresholds should be used to trigger further investigation 
once an anomaly is detected. The second problem involves the decision to 
respond to an anomaly, which again is a matter of political or analytical 
judgment. As Bell notes, some officials recognized that Sheikh Omar Abdel 
Rahman and his followers did not appear to be typical residents of Jersey 
City, but this awareness was not translated into effective action. The deci-
sion to respond to anomalies might be made on the basis of the principles 
of risk management: anomalies involving certain type of groups or certain 
types of targets might be selected for additional investigation by police 
officers or intelligence analysts. In that sense, the detection of anomalies 
might not be the end of an investigation, but a signal to refocus informa-
tion collection and analytical efforts.
The information revolution makes it easier to hide in plain sight by 
facilitating the movement of ideas, people, and resources across interna-
tional boundaries because the movement of outsiders, as well as ideas and 
resources, are now an everyday occurrence. But the information revolution 
also might provide law enforcement officials and intelligence analysts with 
additional information needed to separate legitimate actors from those 
just masquerading as average people. Everyday life is increasingly digitized 
as people make full use of the services and resources made possible by the 
information revolution. This activity leaves a digital record in a myriad of 
unexpected ways and places. Templates and algorithms already exist that 
can detect anomalies in normal activities, such as the loss or theft of credit 
cards, unauthorized entry into secure facilities, or even increasingly routine 
airline baggage delays. There is no reason to subject anyone to this level 
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of scrutiny on a daily basis, but it might be possible to explore the digital 
reality behind individuals or groups that somehow manage to attract the 
attention of intelligence and law enforcement officials. The requirement 
to fashion a convincing “electronic history” might be beyond the ability of 
small groups or terrorist cells. The absence of this history—living off the 
grid—in some settings might be cause for suspicion itself. In fact, the U.S. 
intelligence community already has recognized the difficulty in manufac-
turing a credible electronic history to match the cover story supplied to its 
own clandestine operatives.19
Conclusion
Admittedly, if taken to their logical conclusions, the ideas presented here are 
downright Orwellian. But this is not a call to monitor people everywhere in 
real time to make sure that their “digital” lives roughly corresponds to some 
template based on their geographic location, employment and family his-
tory, or their socioeconomic status. Instead, the article offers a tool that law 
enforcement can use to evaluate terrorist suspects quickly. It describes why 
terrorists need to hide in plain sight while undertaking their operations, 
and how their modus operandi differs from the more traditional practice 
of denial and deception. It also identifies a critical weakness in their tra-
decraft that might be beyond their ability to remedy quickly with available 
resources. In other words, once individuals come to the attention of law 
enforcement officials in the course of some investigation, their electronic 
bona fides could be matched against their stories. Anomalies would not 
be evidence of guilt, but prudence would suggest that they might require 
further investigation. 
Recent history has shown that terror cells have lived quietly in the 
United States, trying to give the appearance of normalcy until they can 
carry out their attacks. History also has shown that law enforcement and 
intelligence officials have not performed well in responding to anomalous 
behavior. Armed with rudimentary tradecraft, the September 11 hijackers 
were able to hide in plain sight while only attracting a modest amount of 
attention. They did reasonably well mimicking the behavior of average col-
lege students, who often lack visible means of support and have been known 
to spend more time lounging about or in bars than studying. But when cell 
members showed interest in learning how to take off and fly, but not land, 
commercial airliners, they were not acting as ‘normal’ student pilots. At 
that point they had blown their cover. The September 11 hijackers never 
tipped their hand in terms of their plans, but they did fail to preserve their 
image as run-of-the-mill student pilots. The detection of anomalies might 
not be the final solution when it comes to discovering denial and deception 
or detecting terrorists, but it is a good place to start. 
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